

AD-A066 930

ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA F/G 5/4
THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE AMERICAN WILL.(U)
JAN 79 D S PAPP

UNCLASSIFIED

NL

OF |
AD
AD-6830



END
DATE
FILMED
6-79
DDC

LEVEL

(12)
SC

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013


30 JANUARY 1979

*See 1473
in back*

ACN 79001

**THE SOVIET PERCEPTION
OF THE AMERICAN WILL**

AD A0 66930
DDC FILE COPY



MILITARY ISSUES RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT:
Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.

The views, opinions, and/or
findings contained in this report
are those of the author and
should not be construed as an
official Department of the Army
position, policy, or decision,
unless so designated by other
official documentation.

79 04 03 039

**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
US ARMY WAR COLLEGE
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA**

THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE AMERICAN WILL

by

Daniel S. Papp

30 January 1979

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT:
Approved for public release;
distribution unlimited.

DISCLAIMER

The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this memorandum are those of the author and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

ACCESSION for	
NTIS	White Section <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DOC	Buff Section <input type="checkbox"/>
UNANNOUNCED	<input type="checkbox"/>
JUSTIFICATION	<input type="checkbox"/>
BY	
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES	
D	U / OF SPECIAL
A	

FOREWORD

This memorandum seeks to add to the understanding of the Soviet-American military equation by examining the Soviet perception of American will, and assessing its impact on future Soviet foreign policy behavior. The author contends that President Carter's election presented the Kremlin with new uncertainties concerning the policies President Carter would adopt, how successfully he could marshal political support, and what changes he could achieve in the US ability to act in the international environment. The author asserts that the Soviet Union has come to regard President Carter as a clever politician who, to a great degree, has succeeded in reforging American will, and, correspondingly, American ability to undertake certain foreign initiatives. He concludes that the way the Soviet leaders answer questions about the continual evaluation of American will can significantly impact future Soviet foreign policy behavior.

The Military Issues Research Memoranda program of the Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, provides a means for timely dissemination of analytical papers which are not necessarily constrained by format or conformity with institutional policy. These memoranda are prepared on subjects of current importance in areas related to the authors' professional work or interests.

This memorandum was prepared as a contribution to the field of national security research and study. As such, it does not reflect the official view of the College, the Department of the Army, or the Department of Defense.



DeWITT C. SMITH, JR.
Major General, USA
Commandant

79 0.4 03 039
iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

DR. DANIEL S. PAPP is an associate professor of political science at Georgia Institute of Technology. From 1977 to 1978, he served as a research professor with the Strategic Studies Institute. A graduate of Dartmouth College, he received his doctorate in international affairs at the University of Miami's Center for Advanced International Studies. He has published articles in *International Journal*, *Social Science Quarterly*, *Soviet Union*, *Resources Policy*, and *Parameters*, and has recently completed a book manuscript entitled "Vietnam: The Perspective From Three Capitals."

THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF AMERICAN WILL

A century and a half ago, Karl von Clausewitz observed that "war is nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means." Although technological developments and a changed international environment have caused some observers to question the continued legitimacy of the Prussian general's most famous assertion,¹ few would dispute the continued relevance of another of his observations: that "the sum of available means" and "the strength of will" are two indispensable factors which must be considered when assessing a potential enemy's strength. The sum of available means, to Clausewitz, could be estimated since "it depends (although not entirely) on numbers," whereas "the strength of volition is more difficult to determine, and can only be estimated to a certain extent by the strength of the motives." Continuing, Clausewitz argued that will "is not an entirely unknown quantity; it indicates what it will be tomorrow by what it is today." Potential opponents may consequently "form an opinion of the other" based not only on the kind and quality of equipment, but also on the strength and depth of national will.

Clausewitz observations on means and will have as much relevance to modern America as to nineteenth century Europe. Unfortunately, however, the ongoing debate in the United States over the relative

strength of Soviet and American military arsenals too often ignores the point that quantity and quality of arms is only one factor which needs to be examined when discussing the "international correlation of forces," as the Soviets prefer to call it. Without minimizing the importance of quantity-quality considerations, such an approach presents a somewhat myopic view.

This essay, then, examines a factor which has been too often ignored—the Soviet perception of American will—and assesses the possible impact of that perception on current and future Soviet foreign policy.

PROBLEMS OF ANALYSIS

Before we begin our examination of the Soviet perception of American will, a word of caution is perhaps advisable. As Clausewitz warned, will itself is a difficult concept with which to grapple. Since it is an abstract phenomenon, national will cannot be strictly delineated. The subjectivity of the concept of national will is, to a great extent, the product of both the multitude of parameters which determine will and the varying importance which diverse observers attach to these parameters. What goals does a nation have? How important does the political, economic, military, etc., leadership of a nation view these goals as being? What type of risk, how many risks, and how great are the risks which a nation will take to achieve these goals? How unified are the leaders of a nation in their own perceptions and choices of policy? If they are not unified, what are the relative strengths, political and otherwise, of the competing factions? The answers to these and other similar questions all play a role in determining national will. Although Klaus Knorr was referring to intent in his discussions of military statecraft, his observations may well be extended to include national will:

... intent (and national will) is never clear-cut ... it is usually fragmentary and ambiguous. The historical record reveals that changes in the intention (and will) of the other state can come quickly and are very hard to predict.²

What, then, is will? For the purposes of this study, will may be defined as the determination of a nation to achieve its national objectives and defend its national interests. In many ways, national will may be viewed as synonymous with national morale. However, since

this study examines the Soviet perception of American will, it is necessary to approach the concept of will in Marxist-Leninist terms. Whereas Western views of national will tend to stress the necessity of public support for policy actions undertaken at the behest of elite policymakers as a necessary component of successful policy,³ Soviet views are somewhat different. Stressing the class nature of contemporary society, Soviet authorities argue that national will is more determined by the moral qualities of the dominant class.⁴ Attitudes of the masses are consequently reduced in importance when the national will of a non-Socialist society is under examination, at least as far as the Marxist-Leninist is concerned. Consequently in order to gain a more accurate understanding of the Soviet perception of American will, we must first analyze the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint on the subject.

MARXISM-LENINISM AND WILL: AN IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Contemporary Soviet writers refer to the importance of national will (or as they prefer to call it, national morale) in their discussions of the international correlation of forces. Marxism-Leninism, according to one source, takes "full consideration" of the part played by moral factors as well as military and political factors in its assessment of the balance of forces.⁵ Indeed, morale has been described as a factor of "enormous strategic importance," the significance of which "will apply even more in a world nuclear war, should the imperialists unleash it."⁶

More specifically, national will as applied to society as a whole signifies "the resolve of the masses to carry out major social, economic, political, and military tasks."⁷ Soviet analysts do not stop here, however, and it is at this point that their analysis of the role of national will departs from Western interpretations; to the Marxist-Leninist, the strength and solidity of national will is ultimately determined by the nature of the prevailing social system and the degree of class conflict within that state. Thus, in a single class society, the possibility for a breakdown of national will is almost nonexistent because of the lack of class conflict. On the other hand, in multiclass societies, with their accompanying class conflicts, national will is often fragmented. Soviet authors are fond of using the Vietnamese War as an example to buttress their case. According to *Soviet Military Review*, US morale in Vietnam was low because Americans were "fighting only for money" and had

"no lofty (class) ideals worth risking their lives for."⁸ Much the same was true for the domestic front.

Using this approach, Soviet theoreticians view Western societies as being beset by a number of conflicts, some of which have immediate relevance to the issue of national will. First, since there is conflict between classes within non-Socialist states, it is extremely difficult to mobilize will into a single goal-directed entity. National will in non-Socialist states is consequently reduced below that of its Socialist counterpart. Second, and just as importantly, the ruling class in bourgeois states is composed of different segments which themselves have primarily their own interests at heart. The ruling class itself therefore has internal conflicts which reduce the strength of will of the bourgeois state. The Marxist-Leninist argues by definition that non-Socialist states exclude the proletariat and other non-bourgeois classes from the state structure thereby automatically reducing national will. (There are exceptions. See below.) Consequently, this essay will primarily address itself to the second conflict and its impact on the Soviet image of American will.

Following the above line of thought, Marxist-Leninist ideologues maintain that Socialist societies have an innate advantage over other social systems because of the alleged single class nature of Socialist states. Conversely, in capitalist countries, the "socio-political basis of the people's . . . morale is eroding" because of militarism, encroachments of bourgeois democracy, and other similar factors.⁹ In certain instances, though, "bourgeois propagandists" are able to "brainwash" large masses of the population and win their support for certain policies by posing those policies as protective of proletarian class interests. Thus, for short periods of time, national will in a non-Socialist state may be artificially strengthened, but only until the bourgeois deceit is inevitably uncovered.

This does *not* mean, however, that the "will of the masses" plays an inconsequential role in Soviet estimates of the national will of non-Socialist states. Rather, the Kremlin's theorists today recognize that the opinion of nonbourgeois elements in non-Socialist states is a force with which bourgeois policymakers must increasingly contend. Nonetheless, no less a person than Georgi Arbatov warns:

While (such estimates) are basically correct, the arguments about the importance of taking public opinion into consideration and references to . . . will of the man in the street are frequently used in order to conceal the fact that despite the increased influence of the masses, the internal and external policies of the capitalist states continue to be shaped by the ruling bourgeoisie and its political representatives.¹⁰

Thus, while the will of the masses is viewed as an increasingly important factor in the non-Socialist states, it is still much less significant than the will of the bourgeois class. With this small caveat, then, the Soviet perception of American will may be more accurately portrayed as the Soviet perception of American *bourgeois* will.

This will, in turn, consists of two major elements, at least in Soviet eyes. First, conscious class interests are contained within a so-called "socio-ideological" element. This element theoretically reflects the system of prevailing social relations. Second, the "complex aggregate of the notions, impressions, and sentiments which are aroused . . . in everyday life" are contained within a "socio-psychological" element. There is no sharp line of distinction between these two perceived elements of will, and it is further cautioned that if a people's socio-psychological outlook does not contain ideological elements, their morale can be "neither lofty nor firm."¹¹

In summation, then, the Marxist-Leninist image of national will views the concept as a manifestation of class morale. In the context of a non-Socialist society, the will of the dominant class is the most significant for policy matters, although the will of the dominated class is becoming increasingly important. Correspondingly, the major assumption underlying this study is that the Soviet Union, to a great extent, gauges its estimates of American national will both on the degree of consensus within the ruling class and on the ability of the dominant segment of the ruling class ("realist" or "reactionary," depending on time and place) to muster both bourgeois and, to a lesser degree, proletariat support behind it. With this background, then, we can now turn to recent Soviet perceptions of American will.

THE FORD ADMINISTRATION: AMERICAN PARALYSIS

By American standards, Gerald Ford attained the Presidency under highly unusual circumstances. Richard Nixon's resignation left many Americans wondering about the continued viability of their government, and questioning the continuity of both domestic and foreign policies. Ford, in short, was an unknown quantity. Although he had spent all his adult life in politics, his emergence as the predominant US political figure was both unexpected and unsettling.

If Ford was an unknown quantity to most Americans, he was an even more unknown figure to the Soviet Union. While Soviet

statements stressed Moscow's desire to make Soviet-American detente "irreversible," Ford himself remained a new factor, and despite his assurances that Nixon's foreign policy path would be pursued, he had not yet been tested. Even more importantly, in Soviet eyes, the question remained whether Ford could implement the policies he claimed he desired. According to Soviet analysts, one of the major factors leading to Nixon's resignation was the debate over detente. The Watergate Affair itself was viewed as "the fragment of rock which caused a landslide which ultimately cut short the career of the 37th President of the United States."¹² The scandal was only one of several manifestations of "an acute domestic political struggle," the result of a feud between a Democratic Congress and a Republican White House and between pro-detente and anti-detente forces.¹³ One source sarcastically pondered whether Nixon's resignation was a "triumph for US democracy" or "Democratic revenge" for the 1972 election debacle.¹⁴ Another article addressed the detente issue directly:

Does not the desire to 'trip up' responsible Americans who have embarked on the path of talks and agreements with the Soviet Union account for the raising up by some US politicians a ballyhoo over the internal squabbles and scandals in the country?¹⁵

From the very moment of Ford's assumption of power, then, the Soviets had questions about his ability to implement policy. These questions emanated not necessarily from the Kremlin's unfamiliarity with Ford, but rather from its view of the causes of Watergate itself.¹⁶ From Moscow's viewpoint, Ford was beset by problems of policy execution caused by conflict within the American government. American national will as reflected in the President's ability to unilaterally act had been compromised, and the Soviet leadership realized it.

The Kremlin's realization that intragovernment conflict was causing inertia in American policies was not a product of Nixon's resignation, although it was directly attributable to the Watergate Affair. Eight months before the resignation, Soviet diplomats were telling their Western European counterparts that the Kremlin regarded American policies as unpredictable because of Nixon's uncertain future.¹⁷ Indeed, Soviet attitudes toward Congress itself indicated that Moscow had developed a new respect for the policymaking potential of that legislative body. Earlier Soviet attitudes had disparaged Congress and its ability to influence Presidential action,¹⁸ but by spring 1974, the

Kremlin began to pay greater heed to the American legislature. Senator Ted Kennedy traveled to the Soviet Union in March and was accorded treatment usually reserved for heads of state. In May, a Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Candidate Member of the Politburo and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Boris Ponomarev spent several days in Washington with members of Congress.¹⁹ By the time of Nixon's actual resignation, one Soviet assessment of Congress went as far as declaring that Congress had "in effect forced Nixon to resign."²⁰

Correspondingly, American national will had been compromised. Congress' increased influence would force Nixon's successor, according to Soviet estimates, to balance conflicting interests more delicately than Nixon himself had. Policies preferred by the executive now more than ever had to be tempered with Presidential awareness of Congressional sentiment. Throughout the fall of 1974, Soviet commentary noted the unevenness of American policy despite Ford's protestations that he wished to continue detente.²¹ While Ford himself was chastised by the Soviet media only in relation to his proposed trip to South Korea,²² Secretary of Defense Schlesinger's revival of the theory of a limited Soviet-American nuclear exchange and the continuing difficulties encountered by the Soviet-American trade bill in Congress proved, to the Soviets, that Ford was not master in his own house. The criticism aimed at the Vladivostok SALT understanding reached by Brezhnev and Ford in November 1974 added weight to this Soviet perception. Although leading Soviet journals argued that the Vladivostok summit had struck "a blow against the hopes and plans cherished by the enemies of detente"²³ and had given "a new mighty impulse" to further Soviet-American cooperation,²⁴ the same journals also cautioned that anti-detente forces remained strong and were stepping up their anti-detente activities.

This Soviet analysis of the first few months of the Ford administration fit well within the Soviet class perspective of American politics and American national will discussed in the preceding section. It is interesting to note that while Soviet analysts recognized two trends within American ruling circles even during the latter years of the Eisenhower administration,²⁵ it was not until the Nixon administration that the proponents of a "more realistic approach" to Soviet-American relations finally prevailed.²⁶ To the Soviets, Nixon's policies provided ample proof of this ideological position. According to one Hedrick Smith report from Moscow, Russians argued that "under Nixon . . . practical steps (toward detente) have been taken; not (under) Johnson, not Kennedy even, but Nixon."²⁷ With Nixon's demise and

the resurgence of Congress as an influence on decisionmaking, the preeminence of the "realistic" forces of the bourgeoisie which existed during the Nixon Presidency was no longer assured. Thus, while American policy became uncertain during the aftermath of the Nixon resignation, American will to implement *any* policy became an unknown factor as the two trends within the ruling class competed for predominance. Nowhere was this Soviet perception made more clear than in the Soviet reaction to American policies during the last few months of the existence of the Republic of Vietnam.

By early 1975, Moscow realized that a US President's request to Congress for additional aid to Indochinese clients no longer guaranteed the delivery of that aid. While Ford and Kissinger were castigated for their continued support of more aid for Thieu in South Vietnam and Lon Nol in Cambodia, the Kremlin's observers noted with satisfaction that "many members of the US Congress share the realistic appraisal" that the collapse of both regimes was "inevitable," and therefore opposed the aid request.²⁸ As the regimes' positions deteriorated in March and April, this viewpoint solidified. "Rationally thinking Americans" wanted nothing more to do with Thieu since he had been "rejected by the (South Vietnamese) people," one report noted,²⁹ while another indicated that "broad segments of the American public, some representatives of the American press, and certain political circles" had a "realistic understanding of the situation" and wanted "total American noninvolvement."³⁰ One prominent Soviet journal argued that Congress "hesitated to extend additional aid" because of the "utter inviability and evident bankruptcy of the Thieu clique." Ford, on the other hand, still labored under "the concept of American omnipotence." This executive-legislative stalemate ended as "life itself resolved the question" of additional aid.³¹

To the Kremlin, American will was quite clearly fragmented. The "ruling political circles" each quite clearly had their own preferred policy option, Moscow realized, but since they could not reach a consensus on policy, American responses to the North Vietnamese onslaught were effectively paralyzed.

It is in this light, then, that the restrained Soviet reaction to the fall of Saigon may most accurately be viewed. When Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny sent a congratulatory message of greeting to the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government in early May, they merely observed that "the Soviet Union has invariably and firmly supported and will continue to support the

patriots of South Vietnam and the Vietnamese people."³² Other Soviet publications noted that the final end to the Indochinese conflict meant that world tension could now be reduced.³³ Even more strikingly, when Brezhnev delivered his May 8 speech marking the Thirtieth Anniversary of the end of World War II, he lauded detente and the end of the Indochinese wars, but directed absolutely no criticism at the United States.³⁴ This ongoing effort to "save American face," if it may be termed that, continued in the Soviet coverage of the "Mayaguez" incident in mid-May. For the most part, the Soviet media delivered factual accounts of the affair without overt condemnation, although foreign commentary was reported.³⁵

With American ability to formulate long-term policy seriously undermined by the inability to establish governmental consensus on policy, and with even short-term reaction to crisis situations being subjected to partisan political debate, it is little wonder that the Soviet leadership and media presented the fall of South Vietnam and the "Mayaguez" incident in moderate terms. From this point of view, the objective reality of the situation spoke for itself. Since the United States was in a "morning-after state" because of Vietnam, to borrow a Soviet phrase,³⁶ the Soviet leadership undoubtedly saw little reason to arouse the United States from its stupor by crowing about its fellow Socialist state's victory. With the executive-legislative standoff and the ongoing "realist-reactionary" debate, American national will was effectively paralyzed, at least as seen from the Kremlin. As far as Moscow was concerned, this was a quite satisfactory situation.

The Soviet view of fragmented American will may even have served as a major input to increase Soviet support for national liberation movements in Africa, most specifically, to the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). While it would be naive to assert that this Soviet perception was the dominant consideration behind the stepped-up Soviet aid of later summer and fall, 1976, it would be equally myopic to ignore this perception as an input to Soviet foreign policy formulation. What better place than a distant, undeveloped, newly-independent nation on a distant, undeveloped, politically unstable continent to verify the Soviet image of a United States constrained by lack of a consensus of will? Indeed, the Soviet media itself linked the congressional attitude toward aid for the pro-Western movements in Angola with its previous attitude toward additional aid to Saigon. After the US Senate defeated the administration's request for appropriations for Angola by a 54-22 vote in mid-December 1975,

the Soviet media trumpeted that Congress had "remembered the lessons of Vietnam." The vote was praised as a "realist position" since it refused to "subsidize the Peoples' Republic of Angola's opponents."³⁷

Even the course of attempted negotiations on Angola reflected the Soviet image of a United States unable to act. Secretary of State Kissinger traveled to Moscow in mid-January 1976, and tried to establish a dialogue on Angola with Brezhnev several times during the course of his visit. Brezhnev simply refused to discuss the situation.

By early 1976, then, it was fairly evident that the Soviet leadership was cognizant of the schisms within the American political elite, and was equally aware that these disagreements significantly undermined the US capability to act in the international environment. American national will, in essence, had been neutralized by the ongoing conflict between "realists" and "reactionaries."

This does not imply that Soviet analysts believed that either segment of the American ruling class had *itself* lost its class will; rather, to the Kremlin, a standoff had developed between the two segments. *International Affairs* made this exceedingly clear. On the one hand, "more and more statesmen . . . admitted the failure of the Cold War strategy." US public opinion itself was becoming more "progressive . . . and increasingly convinced that the US ought once and for all give up the role of "world gendarme." ³⁸ On the other hand, reactionary forces were launching "a virulent campaign against the proponents of realism."³⁹ The military-industrial complex, a core element of the "reactionary" segment was pulling out its "Communist threat statements" to combat the "realists." While the Kremlin admitted that the "Communist threat statements" were intended in part to provide "a morale booster . . . in connection with the recent events in Indochina," detente itself was viewed as the primary target.⁴⁰ As a result of this standoff, American will was paralyzed.

Increasing debate over detente in the United States during the 1976 election campaign gave the Soviet Union ample opportunity to view the level of disagreement in the United States over questions surrounding detente. From Moscow's point of view, the Presidential campaign both confirmed the Soviet image of a paralyzed American will, and forced the Kremlin to recognize that that paralysis was not as severe or as well-delineated as it had previously believed (and probably hoped).

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN: RESURGENT REACTION

As the 1976 election campaign progressed, detente was singled out

as "more and more the key election issue."⁴¹ What is of particular note, however, was the Soviet argument that growing American opposition to detente was "more than just an electoral tactic." Instead, it was "the right wing attempt in both main bourgeois parties" to "keep US foreign policy from further developing detente politically and progressing to the stage of military detente."⁴² No less a personage than Brezhnev himself, speaking at the Twenty-Fifth CPSU Congress in February 1976, warned against "influential forces in the United States that are interested neither in the improvement of relations nor in the easing of international tension."⁴³

Specifically, the Kremlin chastised Henry Jackson, Ronald Reagan, and George Wallace as the chief spokesmen for the forces of American reaction. To observers in the Soviet Union, their candidacies were having a clear and immediate impact on Ford administration policy as Ford moved to cut off criticisms from the "right wing bourgeoisie." *Pravda* condemned the "pressure from the right" which was having a "certain effect on Washington politicians" who were making "strange speeches about the necessity for a two-sided approach to the socialist countries."⁴⁴ Even though the Russians were cognizant that many of the hard-line statements were election rhetoric, there was a genuine uneasiness that the United States would "throw the baby out with the bathwater," to borrow Radio Moscow's phrase.⁴⁵

What implications for US policy, and in turn for national will, did these observations bear? Clearly, Moscow expected a swing to the right in election rhetoric and possibly in policy, but for the most part, divisions within the bourgeoisie were viewed as too deep to permit a resurgence of American will. Indeed, the importance of Ford's abandonment of the term "detente" and substitution of the concept "peace through strength" was minimized by Soviet observers, at least at first. "Renunciation of a word is not renunciation of a policy course," one journal noted, while Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko declared that Ford has "impoverished the American vocabulary, not real life."⁴⁶ Ford's victories in the Florida and Illinois primaries, both coming after his rejection of "detente," consequently solidified the original Soviet reaction to Ford's comments. Rejection of the term "detente" was in fact a domestic political ploy of limited policy significance, according to Moscow.⁴⁷

During the early primary elections, Soviet commentators even implied that while they feared the potential power of the "representatives of reaction," the "realistic forces" *themselves* were

gaining the upper hand. The potential existed, therefore, to remove at least some of the paralysis from American will and "get on with detente" as the "realists" attained predominance.

Soviet reaction to the Ford-Carter victories in the March 9 Florida primary and the March 16 Illinois primary gave eloquent testimony to this Soviet perspective. Following Ford's convincing victory in the Florida primary, Radio Moscow surprisingly admitted that the Kremlin had been "very concerned" about the possibility of a Reagan victory. The Ford-Reagan contest was not "just a local question," but rather "a test of a basic foreign policy." Reagan's loss, when viewed in conjunction with Jackson's third place finish in the Democratic primary, proved that most Americans "shared a common majority outlook" on the question of detente despite "whatever their differences in domestic policy" may be, Radio Moscow informed its listeners.⁴⁸

Carter's victory in Florida was meanwhile attributed to the fact that he had not "clearly defined his program, thereby enabling the voter to interpret it according to his own taste."⁴⁹ His Illinois win was possible, though, because he "condemn(ed) politicians who want the United States to revert to Cold War policies and confrontations with the Soviet Union."⁵⁰ Meanwhile, on the Republican side, Ford's fifth consecutive primary victory left *New Times* with only one conclusion: "Reagan has been beaten in the primaries."⁵¹ Even after Reagan's surprise victory in the March 23 North Carolina contest, the Soviets argued that "anti-detente" candidates had won only two of twelve possible victories, Jackson in Massachusetts (which was attributed to his "racist" anti-bussing position) and Reagan in North Carolina. Clearly, the Kremlin maintained, the primaries proved that the American people supported the pro-detente elements of the ruling class.⁵²

This optimistic Soviet assessment was quickly shattered by a string of Reagan victories which included Texas, Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, and Nebraska. To be sure, Reagan's wins were offset by Ford's successes in Pennsylvania, New York, Wisconsin, West Virginia, and the District of Columbia, but Reagan had nonetheless established himself as a legitimate candidate. Reagan's emergence as a viable anti-detente candidate was further balanced by Carter's continued pro-detente success in the Democratic campaigns, but the question still remains: what accounted for Reagan's sudden surge?

To Moscow, there were two major explanations. First, Ford had blundered by making "concessions to the right." Second, with Jackson's withdrawal from the primary campaigns following his defeat

in Pennsylvania and Wallace's continuing futility (with the exception of the Alabama primary), American reactionaries had coalesced behind the former California governor.

As we have already seen, when Ford first abandoned the term "detente" and adopted the phrase "peace through strength," the Soviets for the most part dismissed the significance of Ford's action. With Reagan's sudden onslaught, however, the Kremlin reassessed its previous view. Ford's rejection of "detente" "cut into his support" and permitted Reagan's fortunes to rise.⁵³ This concession to the right wing, when coupled with Reagan's ability to attract "the forces of reaction and militarism" which at one time favored either Wallace or Jackson,⁵⁴ made the outcome of the Republican race a complex and confused issue, Moscow believed, and at the same time increased the ability of the reactionary forces to influence policy. Whereas only a few months earlier Moscow had hoped for a new-found American national consensus supporting detente to attain predominance, by mid-summer, Moscow believed, American ruling circles were once again deadlocked. National will was again paralyzed, and reactionary forces were resurgent.

The national conventions of both parties did little to alter this Soviet perception. On the Democratic side, even before the convention, the Kremlin recognized that Carter's nomination was assured. While Carter's vagueness on policy enabled "conservatives to see him as a conservative, moderates to see him as a moderate, and liberals as a liberal,"⁵⁵ the Party platform drew more vehement criticism. According to *Izvestia*:

(The Democratic platform) tries to combine the incompatible. On the one hand, it contains some realistic statements in support of the relaxation of tensions . . .

On the other hand, the sensible statements are juxtaposed by assertions taken from the arsenal of those opposed to detente and international cooperation.⁵⁶

The reason for the contradiction, Moscow argued, was clear. Even with Carter's support for detente, the forces of reaction within the Democratic party were strong, and it was impossible for Carter to adopt only one position within the platform and hold the party together. On the whole, Moscow believed that the Democratic nominee supported detente, but at the same time had "some reservations which put you on your guard."⁵⁷ Claims of good will juxtaposed with support for a

strong military, support for negotiations contrasted with the need for a "tougher" negotiating posture, and general support for detente versus a willingness to listen to right wing reactionaries all provided proof, to the Soviets, that reaction remained influential within the Democratic party. Nonetheless, the Kremlin much preferred Carter to Jackson or Wallace.

Ford's final nomination at the Republican convention was similarly viewed in two lights. On the one hand, Reagan's loss marked a "rejection of the ultraconservative course in domestic and foreign policy," *Pravda* pronounced, while Radio Moscow reasoned that Reagan's "attacks on detente frightened many Republicans who are concerned about their party's future."⁵⁸ On the other hand, the Republican platform's foreign policy planks represented a "compromise between the more realistic position of Ford's supporters" and the attempts by Reagan's people "to saturate everything with the poison of Cold War and bellicose chauvinism."⁵⁹ Ford had paid a high price for Republican unity, Moscow cautioned, and his concessions would come back to haunt him.⁶⁰

As the two candidates opened their final campaigns for the White House, then, Soviet analysts believed that both had moved to placate right wing criticism. In Soviet eyes, both candidates sought to build a consensus based on the widest possible coalition bearing in mind the class interests which they represented. Carter, whose earlier moralizing had been respected if not praised by the Soviet press, was now criticized since "whenever he passes from generalization to political specifics, the smokescreen of moralizing maxims disappear, revealing the same old base which is well-known to everyone."⁶¹ Ford was more heavily assailed. For the first time ever one Soviet publication questioned the location of Jerry Ford's true ideological position:

Indeed, before now, in every clash with the ultra-right wing, Ford has made concessions. *The future will tell whether this was dictated by tactical considerations of the struggle for the nomination or by ideological kinship with Reagan.* (Emphasis added)⁶²

Indeed, the forces of reaction have staged a comeback as far as Moscow was concerned. To be sure, American national will remained as fragmented and paralyzed as it had at the beginning of the election campaign as the "realistic" and "reactionary" trends competed with each other, but the situation had become blurred. The Soviet Union was unsure of the preference policies of both Carter and Ford, and

perhaps even more unnerving from the Kremlin's perspective, could not accurately gauge the political forces which supported the two candidates. What would be the political outcome of the election? From Moscow's viewpoint, the only thing that was sure was that a representative of the bourgeoisie would be victorious. What policies he would adopt, and how successfully he could marshal the support of other segments of society behind him remained unanswered questions.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION: POLITICS OR POLICY?

Jimmy Carter's election, to the Kremlin, did not answer these questions, and indeed posed new ones. How "moralistic" would the new administration be? What would the new administration be like, and how would it act in the international environment? These and other questions undoubtedly assailed the Kremlin's policymakers.

Why did Carter win? Soviet sources could not agree. *Izvestiia* listed disenchantment with Ford and his policies, economics, the personality of the candidates, and detente as key issues. Other Soviet papers and journals placed stress on different items within *Izvestiia*'s list. Radio Moscow followed suit. Obviously, in Moscow, there was no unanimity of viewpoint on the cause(s) of Carter's victory. With the Kremlin's realization that "the future course of the foreign and domestic policy of the USA" could be substantially altered by a Presidential campaign and a new President,⁶³ and with Moscow's uncertainty about how to assess Carter, it is perhaps understandable that the Kremlin proceeded cautiously with the new administration.

It is in this light, then, that Brezhnev's assurances to Carter that the Soviet Union had no intention of "testing" the new administration and would actually "go out of its way to avoid any crisis situation,"⁶⁴ may most accurately be viewed. Though Brezhnev had earlier asserted that the new administration would have no choice but to opt for a policy of continued relaxation of tensions,⁶⁵ it was clear from his assurances that he had no desire to add weight to the arguments of those who opposed such a relaxation. With Soviet uncertainty about how to assess Carter, and with the Soviet image of an American will paralyzed by division within the ruling class, Brezhnev may well have been doing his utmost to assure the new and impressionable administration that the Soviet threat was myth rather than reality. At worst, Brezhnev undoubtedly reasoned, paralysis of will would continue; at best, the hand of the

pro-detente element would be strengthened. In either case, the Soviet Union could lose nothing. The potential benefits were obvious.

After the Carter administration took office, the Soviet Union refrained from commenting on the new administration's policies for several months. This "honeymoon" period, if it may be termed that, is a privilege which the Soviet media has regularly accorded new presidents. As *New Times* said, "It will take several months . . . for the passions to subside and for the newly-elected incumbent of the White House to begin seriously shaping administration policy."⁶⁶

Nonetheless, even in the months immediately after Carter took office, the Kremlin made extensive commentary on the forces which were influencing the new administration. It was clear that the Kremlin believed that a fundamental realignment of forces was occurring within American ruling circles. The impact which that realignment would have on national will, however, remained unclear.

Much of the realignment was precipitated by the "reactionary" forces in American society which were afraid the new administration intended to pursue detente more ardently. These circles, though somewhat weakened by the "continuing crisis of capitalism," still had "considerable resources" which they were expanding to undermine detente.⁶⁷ More specifically, the "reactionaries" had the short range goals of pressuring the Carter administration into adopting a "hard-line" with the Kremlin and of winning Carter's support for increased military spending.⁶⁸

The attempts by the American right wing to influence American policy were by no means a new phenomenon, as we have already seen. Indeed, the Russians argued that the "reactionary forces" had managed to "bend the former (Ford) administration's policy line markedly to the right"⁶⁹ and had "substantially retarded" the course of detente during the Ford Presidency.⁷⁰ As Arbatov later said, "for the sake of justice it must be said that the attempts to emasculate the content of detente began before the (Carter) administration came to power."⁷¹

Nonetheless, Carter's accession to power witnessed a revitalization of the "reactionaries" efforts to influence policy, at least as far as the Kremlin was concerned. Led by the "infamous military-industrial complex," the "reactionaries" sought to undermine detente by resurrecting the "myth of the Soviet threat and by claiming that the Soviet Union infringed human rights."⁷² The first issue was rejected as a "fabrication" by no less a personage than Brezhnev in his mid-January speech at Tula, while the second issue was dismissed as "meddling in

internal Soviet affairs" and rejected as illustrative of an American "double standard."⁷³ Interestingly enough, the Soviet rejection of Carter's claim that there was no linkage between "detente" and "human rights"⁷⁴ aligned the Soviets with the hard-line advocates in the United States. The difference between the two positions was that while the Kremlin argued that "human rights meddling" endangered detente and should therefore be terminated, the US hard-line advocates believed that the human rights issue could be used to make detente more productive for the United States.

How successful were the "reactionary" elements in their efforts to influence the Carter administration? The Soviets, once again, were not sure. The uncertainty with which the Kremlin viewed Carter during the election carried over to the early months of his administration. On the one hand, *Pravda* noted shortly before Carter took office, the "reactionaries" influence "on public consciousness and on policy-shaping is no longer what it used to be." On the other hand, the same issue of the party paper declared, "struggle on many aspects of... policy is taking place behind the scenes."⁷⁵ Indeed, Moscow observed that "much (was) unclear about Carter's policy since the opponents of detente (were) still active."⁷⁶

Even so, the Soviet Union appeared to expect Carter to adopt a "moderate center" policy despite the actions and influence of the right wing. Carter's cabinet choices, his verbal support for arms control, and his desire for a new SALT agreement were all favorably received in the Soviet Union.⁷⁷ One Novosti report went as far as proclaiming that a "very valuable atmosphere of trust" was building "cautiously but steadily" between Carter and Brezhnev, even though "only time will tell" whether Carter could overcome the pressures of the right.⁷⁸

As Carter stressed the human rights issue in the early months of his presidency, and as his promised military budget cutback failed to materialize, the Soviets increasingly maintained that reactionary forces "evidently have had some success" with their propaganda.⁷⁹ "Pursuing detente and meddling in internal Soviet affairs" were incompatible, *Pravda* thundered, and Carter's claim that cruise missiles would not be discussed in upcoming negotiations similarly showed that the military industrial complex was "making itself felt in Washington."⁸⁰ The Carter administration exhibited "a certain duality" in its words and deeds, Moscow reported.⁸¹

Thus, by March, the Soviet Union believed that right wing pressures were beginning to have an effect on American policy. While the

Kremlin refrained from linking the Carter administration to the right wing of US politics, it was extremely evident that the new President was viewed as a malleable leader. Earlier, Moscow had cautioned that Carter's preferences for detente did "not mean that a straight and open road to agreements" had opened.⁸² By March, "reactionaries in both parties" had succeeded in intensifying "the struggle to preserve and further detente."⁸³ The "complex ins and outs of contemporary US political life," as *Pravda* termed it, had influenced Carter to turn away from certain of his campaign promises. The "duality" which pervaded Carter's attitudes and policies was nowhere more apparent to the Soviets than in his strategic arms limitation proposals and strategic weapons decisions of March through July.⁸⁴

Secretary of State Vance presented the American arms limitation proposals to the Soviets during his March 26-30 trip to the Soviet Union. The Soviets immediately and vocally rejected both the "comprehensive" package and the "limited" package as giving a "unilateral advantage" to the United States. The Soviet leadership, apparently fearing that the American initiatives had cast the Soviet Union in an obstructionist role, launched a media blitz decrying the US positions as "unrealistic." Invariably, however, the media coverage reaffirmed the Soviet desire for "progress in future negotiations."⁸⁵

Why had Carter made such "unrealistic" proposals? The Kremlin advanced a number of somewhat contradictory explanations. First, the US proposals were indicative of the increased influence of the "Washington hawks" who were seeking to undermine detente. Carter had momentarily succumbed to their pressures, according to this view. Second, Carter had simply "blundered" by sending Vance to Moscow. This explanation implied Carter had acted on naivete, a theme which would later be developed more fully. Nonetheless, to the Soviets, this "blunder" had "played into the hands of the hawks."⁸⁶ Third, and another view which would be increasingly stressed in future months, was the observation that the United States was "trying to make big politics on cunning, on its striving to hoodwink the partner." This view stressed that "sincerity and honesty" were vital in negotiations.⁸⁷ The implication was that Carter himself was a clever politician who was seeking to balance the contending forces in American society to build a new consensus on which he could base policy. Perhaps most significantly, none of the divergent Soviet attitudes toward Carter directly criticized the President. Soviet assessments of him ran the gamut from "clever" to "naive," but in all cases, the Soviet

commentary left the impression that American policy had not yet been locked into a particular course or direction. The influence of the "reactionaries" had increased, it was true, but to the Soviets, this did not imply that Carter had fallen under their sway. On the other hand, voices of "realism" had become less influential. American national will, as far as the Kremlin was concerned, was an unknown quantity. Its former paralysis was in the process of disappearing, but the Kremlin was not at all sure what would replace it.

Carter's strategic weapons decisions of May through July somewhat clarified the Soviet's confusion. The Soviets castigated the decisions to deploy the MK 12-A warhead, fund the Trident and cruise missile systems, and develop a neutron bomb as "inconsistent" with the objectives of SALT and "inevitable" sources of another spiral in the arms race. *Pravda*, *Izvestiia*, *Krasnaia Zvezda*, and other Soviet publications contributed to the outcry in practically every issue. Even the decision to stop B-1 production was "not a symptom of moderation or restraint" since the United States acknowledged that the B-52-cruise missile combination would be "more effective."⁸⁸

Why had Carter made these decisions? While one view argued that the MK 12-A decision in particular was designed to give the United States a "trump card at SALT,"⁸⁹ most Soviet commentary maintained that Carter had continually made "concession(s) to the military and industrial complex."⁹⁰ The weapons decisions were jointly described as a "relapse into the old policy of American imperialism."⁹¹ Carter himself was directly criticized on occasion, but again, the Soviets left no doubt that they believed US policy was still open to change. *Sovetskaya Rossiya* eloquently expressed both sides of the Kremlin's viewpoint:

The military-industrial complex is exacting an increasingly sinister influence on Washington.... Those who see the development of international events in a realistic light hope that the present US administration will manage to find a more sober approach to the problems it faces.⁹²

In the wake of the strategic weapons decisions, it became increasingly apparent that the Soviets were torn between two views of the Carter administration. The first view saw Carter as naive in matters of state, unwittingly permitting himself to be used as an agent of reactionary circles. The second view saw Carter as a skilled and shrewd politician, balancing the competing segments of the ruling circles while

at the same time appealing to the nonbourgeois elements of society. *New Times* for example, asked whether policy was being made "in the White House or Pentagon," and stressed that when crucial decisions were made, reactionary forces should "not be allowed, *intentionally or unintentionally*, to acquire too great an influence." (Emphasis added.)⁹³

According to the first view, Carter's "meddling in domestic Soviet affairs" was in part due to "the new leader's lack of political experience."⁹⁴ While the new President had tried to "demonstrate an active posture" on arms limitations questions, he had on occasion "played into the hands" of those opposing detente. Those opposing detente had "exerted psychological pressure" on the Carter administration, and, in essence, had taken advantage of Carter's lack of expertise.⁹⁵ This argument, however, increasingly fell into disuse at the expense of the "Carter-the-politician" outlook, although Carter's naivete was still occasionally discussed. Radio Moscow sought to blend the two outlooks:

(US policies are determined by) the ambition of the new men in the Washington leadership who want to acquire as rapidly as possible the political support they lack by using demagoguery and playing on the chauvinistic feelings of the American men in the street A certain role appears also to have been played by the obvious inexperience of the new leadership. . . .⁹⁶

Radio Moscow's conclusion that "political greenhorns can learn" served as the point of departure for later Soviet observation that the American effort to "correct detente . . . (has) deeper roots than the inexperience of the new administration." Arbatov, writing in *Pravda*, put Carter's rhetoric and policies once again within the confines of class interpretations: "These roots (of Carter's policies) lie in the aspirations of the US ruling class, aspirations which in the past gave rise to the Cold War."⁹⁷ Although Arbatov balanced his pessimism with observations that there were "positive aspects" to the Carter presidency, there was little doubt that the Russians were less convinced than ever that Carter's "duality" was unintentional. As Radio Moscow earlier said, "there is every sign that in the past a more realistic view of things prevailed."⁹⁸

CONCLUSIONS: NATIONAL WILL AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY

Even with the emerging Soviet perception that Carter is a skillful

politician rather than a naive blunderer, the Soviet leadership has not yet cast him in either a "realistic" or "reactionary" mold. While the Kremlin believes that "the present administration . . . takes its cues in many ways from reactionary circles,"⁹⁹ it at the same time observes that "the problem of continuity in US politics has not yet been resolved, and a struggle is still apparently under way around it."¹⁰⁰ Significantly, "how this situation shapes up in the future depends to a large extent on the US administration."¹⁰¹

Carter's impact on American will is another story. While the Kremlin hesitates to predict which course short-term American policy will take, it is evident that the Soviet Union no longer believes that the United States is immobilized by the paralysis of will which inflicted the country, in their eyes, during the Ford administration. Carter's strategic arms policy has won support for him from the "reactionaries" within the bourgeoisie. His rhetoric about arms limitation has won him the allegiance of the "realists." His advocacy of human rights has paid dividends with wide support within the bourgeoisie, and has even won him the allegiance of certain elements of the "progressive" forces within the United States. Indeed, one *Pravda* article, reprinted in *New Times*, argued that a major goal of the human rights campaign was to "disorient and divide the progressive social and political forces in the capitalist countries."¹⁰² Judging by the loud and continuing Soviet outcry against the human rights campaign, the Kremlin believes it is working.

In a little over a year, then, President Carter succeeded in reducing opposition to administration policy within the bourgeois ruling class by giving the appearance of supporting policies favored by different segments within that class, at least in Soviet eyes. As a spin-off effect of the human rights campaign, nonbourgeois elements of American society whose support is less necessary but nonetheless increasingly important for the implementation of policy have also supported Carter. As a result, the centrifugal force which fragmented and paralyzed American will in the wake of Watergate and Vietnam has been reduced, and American national will is once again coalescing into a more effective unit. Although the Soviet leadership does not yet discern which policies shall be pursued with the aid of this temporarily strengthened will, there is no doubt, in the Kremlin's eyes, that the course of history will eventually necessitate readoption of a "realistic" foreign policy. This will occur as elements of bourgeois society again gain predominance. To the Soviets, these processes are inevitable. Only the timeframe remains vague.

From the Kremlin's point of view, these observations inevitably

carry significant policy import. Fragmented or paralyzed American will affords the Soviet Union greater opportunity to act unopposed in the international arena; revitalized will reduces that opportunity. Thus, it is probably reasonable to expect few Soviet foreign policy initiatives in the immediate future which challenge critical American security concerns, since such initiatives would inevitably further strengthen US resolve.

This does not mean, however, that instances of potential Soviet-American military confrontation or indirect surrogate confrontation will disappear or even be reduced. Rather, one may expect the Kremlin to cautiously test American resolve, particularly in areas which may be viewed in the United States as peripherally important. With the Soviet Union's expanded military capabilities, these efforts may well occur in areas increasingly remote from traditional Soviet areas of interest.

The exact role that the Soviet perception of American will shall have in determining the location, intensity, and frequency of such future efforts is uncertain. To be sure, however, it does exist. Given the importance which the Kremlin's leaders attach to subjective factors of national power such as will, it is evident that US policymakers, in fashioning their responses to Soviet initiatives, face an increasingly difficult task—not only must they define American interests in peripherally important areas and formulate policies to protect those interests, but they must also design those policies so that the Soviet Union—and its surrogates—correctly interpret the “signals” those policies inevitably send. To repeat, this will become an increasingly difficult task in future years.

Still, it is a challenge which must be successfully met. An inaccurate Soviet perception of American will, particularly if that perception underestimates US resolve, is as dangerous to American security as is an actual lack of will. Through the remainder of this century and beyond, then, one of the major challenges to US policymakers will be to create in the minds of Soviet leaders, as they learn to live with their own new global capabilities, an accurate image of American will.

ENDNOTES

1. In the United States, one of the earliest disclaimers of Clausewitz' position appeared in *The Absolute Weapons*, edited by Bernard Brodie in 1946. More recently, Henry Kissinger has declared that "the traditional mode of military analysis which saw in war a continuation of politics . . . is no longer applicable." See Michael Howard, ed., *The Theory and Practice of War*, London, 1965, p. 291. On the Soviet side, Malenkov's 1954 assertion that there would be no victor in a nuclear exchange was the earliest manifestation of the Kremlin's questioning of Clausewitz' principle. Though Malenkov's questioning was quickly rejected and replaced by unquestioned acceptance of Clausewitz' idea, certain Soviet authorities have recently again begun to question the Prussian general's fundamental position. According to one source, war has ceased to be "a continuation of politics, as it was defined in his time by Clausewitz." See N. I. Lebedev, "Great October and the USSR's Struggle for Disarmament at the Contemporary Stage," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, No. 2, March-April 1977, p. 9.
2. Klaus Knorr, "Military Statecraft," in James N. Rosenau, et al., *World Politics*, New York, 1976, p. 381.
3. For example, Charles Frankel argues "for better or worse, a foreign policy will not be effective over the long run if public opinion does not support it." See Charles Frankel, "Morality and U.S. Foreign Policy," *Headline Series No. 224*, February 1975, p. 3.
4. *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 16-18; and *Problems of War and Peace*, Moscow, 1972, pp. 79-81 both make this point by implication.
5. *Socialism and Capitalism: Score and Prospects*, Moscow, 1971, p. 245.
6. *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, p. 310.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
8. A. Leontyev, "How the Americans Fight in Vietnam," *Soviet Military Review*, No. 3, March 1966, p. 53; and *Krasnaia Zvezda*, March 2, 1966.
9. *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, p. 312.
10. George Arbatov, *The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations*, Moscow, 1973, p. 49.
11. *Marxism-Leninism on War and Army*, p. 317.
12. I. Andronov, "The Changeover in the White House," *New Times*, No. 33, August 1974, pp. 6-7.
13. *Za Rubezhom*, No. 34, August 1974, p. 4.
14. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, August 14, 1974.
15. *Za Rubezhom*, No. 32, August 1974. See also Hedrick Smith, *The Russians*, New York, 1976, pp. 241-244.
16. For a detailed examination of the Soviet perception of Watergate, see Daniel S. Papp, "Nixon, Brezhnev, Ford and Watergate: The Effects of a Domestic Crisis on Soviet-American Relations," *Georgia Political Science Association Journal*, Volume IV, No. 1, Spring, 1976, pp. 3-20.
17. *The New York Times*, November 16, 1973.
18. Soviet Deputy Prosecutor General Mikhail Malyarov's comments that the Congressional and Special Prosecutor's investigation of Nixon was "calculated just for show" and that "all Nixon has to do is show a little firmness, and the whole

thing will come to nothing," is indicative of the earlier Soviet predilection to emphasize Presidential predominance. See Smith, p. 242.

19. It should be noted that the Soviet leadership especially desired Congressional passage of the 1974 Soviet-American Trade Bill. With Congress exerting its new found activeness, Soviet leaders undoubtedly reasoned it was necessary to "stroke" both Congress and the White House.

20. Andronov, p. 6.

21. See any of a number of articles in *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, or *International Affairs* from September through December.

22. See *The New York Times*, September 22, 1974.

23. G. Trofimenko, "On a Pivotal Course," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnaia Otnosheniia*, No. 1, January 1975, p. 4.

24. "The Vladivostok Meeting," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 12, December 1974, p. 4.

25. See, for example, I. Lenin, ed., *Dvizhushchie sily vneshnei politiki SShA*, Moscow, 1965, p. 495.

26. G. Arbatov, "Soviet-American Relations in the 1970's," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 4, May 1974, translated in JPRS 62191, p. 18.

27. *The New York Times*, December 8, 1973.

28. *Pravda*, March 9, 1975.

29. *Ibid.*, April 5, 1975.

30. *Ibid.*, April 30, 1975. See also I. Andronov, "The Lesson of Saigon," *New Times*, No. 19, May 1975, p. 19.

31. A. Sergeyev, "The Just Cause of the Indochina Peoples Has Triumphed," *International Affairs*, No. 7, July 1975, p. 43.

32. *Pravda*, May 6, 1975.

33. For example, see D. Volsky, "Peace Comes to Indochina," *New Times*, No. 19, May 1975, pp. 16-18.

34. *Izvestiia*, May 8, 1975.

35. See *Pravda*, May 15-20, 1975, inclusive.

36. V. Osipov, "The Political Consequences of the Crisis in the West," *International Affairs*, No. 3, March 1975, p. 73.

37. *Izvestiia*, December 26, 1975; and January 10, 1976, and V. Pustov, "The Battle of Angola," *New Times*, No. 6, February 1976, p. 8.

38. G. Trofimenko, "From Confrontation to Coexistence," *International Affairs*, No. 10, October 1975, p. 38; I. Romanov, "Instructive Lessons," *International Affairs*, No. 9, September 1975, p. 125; and M. Kuchin, "Objective Factors of Detente," *International Affairs*, No. 3, March 1975, p. 54.

39. Y. Melnikov, "US Foreign Policy: Traditions and Present Trends," *International Affairs*, No. 10, October 1976, p. 94.

40. *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, July 27, 1975, translated in *FBIS (Soviet Union)*, August 4, 1975, p. B3.

41. *Pravda*, March 12, 1976; *Selskaia zhizn'*, April 25, 1976; and Radio Moscow, May 29, 1976.

42. H. Winter, "Whither U.S. Foreign Policy at the Bicentenary?," *World Marxist Review*, No. 5, May 1976, pp. 91-92. Soviet coverage of the 1976 election was rather sophisticated, and realized that the Democratic and Republican parties themselves were split into "realistic," "reactionary," and "centrist" wings each of which advocated different policies.

43. *Pravda*, February 25, 1976. For more detailed interpretations of the Soviet attitude toward anti-detente sentiment in the United States, see M. Lvov, "Detente: Need the Pros and Cons be Weighed Again?," *New Times*, No. 5, May 1976, pp. 4-6; and P. T. Podlesayi, "Some Interpretations of the Concept of Peaceful Coexistence in the United States," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 10, October 1976, pp. 3-13.

44. *Pravda*, March 21, 1976. See also Y. Nikolayev, "Soviet-American Relations: Problems and Prospects," *International Affairs*, No. 7, July 1976, p. 14.

45. Radio Moscow, March 28, 1976.

46. "Detente Benefits All," *New Times*, No. 42, October 1976, p. 1.

47. This is not to say that the Kremlin ignored the *potential* implications of Ford's statement. "Peace through strength," *New Times* protested, was "the very 'positions of strength' policy which yielded its architects nothing but miscalculations and debacles" in earlier years. See *New Times*, March 19, 1976.

48. Radio Moscow, March 11, 1976.

49. *Izvestiia*, March 13, 1976.

50. *Pravda*, March 21, 1976.

51. I. Andronov, "At the Distant Approaches to the White House," *New Times*, No. 12, March 1976, p. 11.

52. *Izvestiia*, April 3, 1976; *Za rubezhom*, No. 13, April 1976; and Radio Moscow, March 26, 1976.

53. I. Andronov, "Three Bids for the White House," *New Times*, No. 25, June 1976, p. 8. See also *Pravda*, May 17, 1976; V. Zolotykhin, "On the Path Toward the White House," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 6, June 1976, p. 26; and Melnikov, p. 93.

54. *Za rubezhom*, No. 21, May 1976; and *Moskovskaia pravda*, June 13, 1976.

55. Zolotykhin, p. 28; and *Izvestiia*, June 20, 1976; and July 10, 1976.

56. *Izvestiia*, June 25, 1976. Other commentary on the platform's internal contradictions is contained in *Pravda*, July 13, 1976; and *Moskovskaia pravda*, July 17, 1976.

57. *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 21, 1976. See also I. Andronov, "The Democrats Nominate Carter," *New Times*, No. 30, July 1976, p. 13; *Izvestiia*, July 10, 1976; and *Pravda*, July 16, 1976.

58. *Pravda*, August 19, 1976; and August 20, 1976; and Radio Moscow, August 19, 1976, and August 20, 1976.

59. *Izvestiia*, August 17, 1976; and August 25, 1976.

60. *Pravda*, August 20, 1976; August 22, 1976; August 25, 1976; and August 27, 1976; and *Za rubezhom*, No. 34, August 1976.

61. *Izvestiia*, October 29, 1976; and Radio Moscow, October 15, 1976.

62. *Za rubezhom*, No. 35, September 1976.

63. Zolotykhin, p. 29.

64. See the December 2, 1976 press release on the Brezhnev assurances issues by Carter's press secretary, Jody Powell. Brezhnev reportedly assured Carter twice, once through elder statesman Averell Harriman and once through Ford's Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, that the Soviet Union would not test the new administration.

65. Brezhnev made this comment at the October plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and was intended to apply to whoever won the US

election. It was later given extensive coverage in the Soviet press. For Brezhnev's original statement, see *Pravda*, October 26, 1976. For later coverage, see *Pravda*, October 30, 1976; and *Trud*, November 11, 1976.

66. I. Ardronov, "Nearing the Finish," *New Times*, No. 43, October 1976, p. 9.

67. *Pravda*, January 20, 1977; and *Izvestiia*, February 25, 1977.

68. For a few of the many Soviet articulations of the twin goals of American reaction, see *Pravda*, January 11, 1977; and January 15, 1977; *Izvestiia*, January 14, 1977; *Krasnaia zvezda*, January 9, 1977; and January 23, 1977; and *Za rubezhom*, No. 2, January 1977.

69. A. Chernyshov, "For the Benefit of the Soviet and American Peoples, In the Interest of World Peace," *International Affairs*, No. 3, March 1977, p. 37; and V. Makarov and A. Chernyshov, "On the Band Wagon of Soviet Menace," *International Affairs*, No. 4, April 1977, p. 105.

70. V. Berezhkov, "Basic Principles of Soviet-US Relations," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 4, April 1977, pp. 3-11.

71. *Pravda*, August 3, 1977.

72. These claims were made on a regular basis by almost every issue of leading Soviet journals and newspapers during January and February.

73. For example, see *Izvestiia*, March 17, 1977; and *Za rubezhom*, No. 12, March 1977.

74. *Izvestiia*, February 19, 1977; and February 25, 1977; and *Pravda*, February 23, 1977.

75. *Pravda*, December 24, 1976.

76. *Sovetskaya Litva*, December 19, 1976, translated in *FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, January 3, 1977, p. B4. See also *Pravda*, January 6, 1977.

77. *Pravda*, December 28, 1976; and January 26, 1977; and Radio Moscow, January 8, 1977 in *FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, January 12, 1977, p. B1.

78. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, January 19, 1977; and *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, January 21, 1977, translated in *FBIS*, January 27, 1977, p. B1.

79. M. Fyodorov, "The 39th President Takes Over," *New Times*, No. 4, January 1977, p. 9. See also the Arbatov article in *Pravda*, February 5, 1977.

80. *Pravda*, March 13, 1977.

81. *Ibid.* See also V. Berezhkov, "A Constructive Approach is Necessary," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, No. 5, May 1977, p. 52.

82. *Za rubezhom*, No. 5, January 1977.

83. V. Chernyshov, "At the Start of a Presidency," *New Times*, No. 5, January 1977, p. 9; and William Jackson, "US Hawks Step Up Activities," *World Marxist Review*, No. 3, March 1977, p. 30.

84. *Pravda*, April 8, 1977.

85. For example, see "Andrei Gromyko's March 31 Press Conference," *International Affairs*, No. 5, May 1977, pp. 1-11; *Pravda*, April 3, 1977; and *Izvestiia*, April 2, 1977; and April 9, 1977.

86. G. Victorov and M. Chernousov, "Hawks on the Warpath," *New Times*, No. 16, April 1977, pp. 12-13.

87. *Izvestiia*, April 3, 1977.

88. *Pravda*, July 3, 1977; and V. Kuznetsov, "The Insatiable Pentagon," *New Times*, No. 29, July 1977, pp. 8-9. It is interesting to note that the Russians expected a positive decision on the R-1 as late as July 1. See *Izvestiia*, July 1, 1977.

89. *Pravda*, June 9, 1977.
90. Radio Moscow, May 4, 1977, in *FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, May 5, 1977, p. B3; and *Za rubezhom*, No. 20, May 1977.
91. *Pravda*, July 10, 1977.
92. *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, August 23, 1977.
93. "In the White House or in the Pentagon?," *New Times*, No. 28, July 1977, p. 1.
94. Radio Moscow, June 18, 1977, in *FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, June 20, 1977, p. B1.
95. For further discussion of this view, see "Soviet-American Talks in Moscow," *International Affairs*, No. 6, June 1977, pp. 1-10; and D. Dragunsky, "The Myth About the Soviet Threat," *Soviet Military Review*, No. 6, June 1977, pp. 40-41.
96. Radio Moscow, June 23, 1977, in *FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, June 24, 1977, p. B2.
97. *Pravda*, August 3, 1977. On May 26, *Izvestiia* maintained that Carter's initiatives "have often been dictated not so much by the interests of serious policy as by rhetoric geared to propagandistic dividends and television effect."
98. Radio Moscow, July 23, 1977, in *FBIS Daily Report (Soviet Union)*, July 25, 1977.
99. G. Svyatov, "Endless Zigzags," *New Times*, No. 32, August 1977, p. 11.
100. *Pravda*, August 3, 1977.
101. *Ibid.*
102. *Ibid.*, February 12, 1977; and "Behind the Human Rights Hullabaloo," *New Times*, No. 9, February 1977, p. 7.

OTHER RECENTLY PUBLISHED MEMORANDA

Detente, National Security, and Multinational Corporations	AD A013014
Nonconsonant Detente and NATO	AD A013522
Deterrence and Detente	AD A013979
The Impact of Crises on the Evolution of Strategy and Forces in an Era of Detente	AD A014158
The Terror Trap	AD A014159
Collective Defense, Neutralization, and the Balance of Power: Contending Security Policies in Southeast Asia	AD A015464
Precision Guided Munitions: Implications for Detente	AD A015465
Chile, 1964-74: The Successes and Failures of Reformism	AD A015466
International Leadership in an Era of Detente	AD A015467
Detente and the Eastern Mediterranean	AD A016859
Terrorism and the Military Response	AD A016860
The Prospects of Soviet American Alliance	AD A016884
A Fifth Round in the Middle East? Western European Perceptions	AD A017049
Nuclear Strategy for Defending a Border	AD A017050
Being Number One Nation: Primacy and Detente	AD A017794
Interests and Strategies in an Era of Detente: An Overview	AD A019091
The Relevance of Civilian Based Defense to US Security Interests	AD A020178

Copies of any of these memoranda may be obtained from the Defense Documentation Center. The request, indicating title and AD number, should be sent to the following address:

**Defense Documentation Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22314**

DISTRIBUTION

ODCSOPS, DA	6
National War College	3
Naval War College	2
Air War College	4
Air University	3
Command and General Staff College	2
Armed Forces Staff College	1
Industrial College of the Armed Forces	2
Inter-American Defense College	1
University of National Defense	1
Defense Intelligence School	1
US Military Academy	2
Marine Corps Development and Education Command	3
National Defence College	1
Royal College of Defense Studies	1
L'Ecole Superieure de Guerre	1
Fuehrungsakademie der Bundeswehr	1
NATO Defence College	1
Concepts Analysis Agency	2
Intelligence Threat Analysis Detachment	1
Training and Doctrine Command	1
Combined Arms Combat Development Activity	1
Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency	1
Office of the Chief of Engineers	1
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency	1
Defense Intelligence Agency	2
Central Intelligence Agency	3
Department of State	2
Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange	1
Institute for Military Assistance	1
US Army Federal Executive Fellow, Brookings Institution	1
US Navy	2
US Marine Corps	2
US Air Force	3
432d Military Intelligence Detachment	1
434th Military Intelligence Detachment	1
467th Military Intelligence Detachment	1
I ROTC Region Headquarters	1
II ROTC Region Headquarters	1
III ROTC Region Headquarters	1
IV ROTC Region Headquarters	1
National Guard Bureau	1
Defense Documentation Center	12
Army Library	1
Military History Research Collection	1
Army War College	57

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER ACN 79001	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) 6 THE SOVIET PERCEPTION OF THE AMERICAN WILL		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Military Issues Research Memorandum
7. AUTHOR 10 Daniel S. Papp		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013		9. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) 12 36 p.
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 11		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		13. REPORT DATE 30 January 1979
		14. NUMBER OF PAGES 31
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report) 9 Military issues research memo.,		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Policy perceptions; national will; policy formulation; Soviet foreign policy; United States; Soviet Union; President Carter		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This memorandum seeks to add to the understanding of the Soviet-American military equation by examining the Soviet perception of American will, and assessing its impact on future Soviet foreign policy behavior. The author contends that President Carter's election presented the Kremlin with new uncertainties concerning the policies President Carter would adopt, how successfully he could marshal political support, and what changes he could achieve in the US ability to act in the international		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

390 230

slr

(con-7) **UNCLASSIFIED**

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

environment. The author asserts that the Soviet Union has come to regard President Carter as a clever politician who, to a great degree, has succeeded in reforging American will, and, correspondingly, American ability to undertake certain foreign initiatives. He concludes that the way the Soviet leaders answer questions about the continual evaluation of American will can significantly impact future Soviet foreign policy behavior.

A

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)